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Giordano: Disparity in Police Procedures

DISPARITY IN POLICE PROCEDURES FOR NON-ENGLISH
SPEAKING DWI SUSPECTS: CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS FOR NON-ENGLISH SPEAKING CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS FALLING SECOND TO GOVERNMENTAL
INTERESTS
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
People v. Salazar1
(decided October 10, 2013)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Salazar, the court found that the New York City
Police Department’s (“NYPD”) driving while intoxicated (“DWI”)
procedures did not violate the defendant’s state or federal constitutional right to due process or equal protection.2 The NYPD administered a breathalyzer test to the non-English speaking defendant but
did not administer a physical coordination test when he was arrested
for driving while intoxicated.3 The defendant challenged the
NYPD’s procedure as a violation of his equal protection and due process rights.4 The defendant prevailed in setting aside the guilty verdict at the trial level; however, on appeal by the State, the First Department, Appellate Division reversed.5 The court evaluated the
defendant’s equal protection claim under a rational basis analysis, 6 as
1

973 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sup. Ct. 2013).
Id. at 143.
3
See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(1) (McKinney 2009) (“No person shall operate a
motor vehicle while the person’s ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by . . . alcohol.”).
4
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 142-43.
5
Id. at 143.
6
Id. at 144 (“To establish an equal protection violation under the rational basis analysis, a
claimant must show that the governmental action in question does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose.”).
2
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opposed to the strict scrutiny analysis utilized by the Bronx County
Supreme Court,7 and found that a rational basis for the policy existed—the impracticability of conducting coordination tests through interpreters.8 Further, the court concluded, “a DWI suspect does not
have a due process right to compel the police to administer a coordination test.”9 Evaluating the defendant’s due process claim under the
Matthews balancing test,10 the court reasoned, because the physical
coordination is an “investigative tool used to gather evidence,” the
failure of the police to administer said test in order to give the defendant an “opportunity to obtain potentially favorable evidence” did
not present a great risk that he would be erroneously deprived of his
liberty.11
The Appellate Division’s holding displays a step in the wrong
direction for courts in providing equal protection of the laws to nonEnglish speaking defendants. The ruling in Salazar represents the
court’s unwillingness to provide more protection to non-English
speaking defendants and disregards those defendants’ constitutional
rights. The cost to remedy the disparity in treatment among nonEnglish and English speaking DWI suspects is sufficiently outweighed by the inherit disadvantages faced by non-English speaking
DWI suspects as a result of the NYPD’s procedures.

7
Strict scrutiny is applied “[w]here governmental action disadvantages a suspect class or
burdens a fundamental right.” Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
Such classification “will be upheld only if the government can establish a compelling justification for the action.” Id. However, “[w]here a suspect class or a fundamental right is not
implicated, the challenged action need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Id.
8
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 144 (setting forth the rational basis for the police the court
stated the police have an interest in the reliability of coordination tests and “[t]he evidence
supports the conclusion that conducting the test through a Spanish-speaking police officer
who was not trained in conducting the test could compromise the reliability of the result.”).
Further the court noted “that it is impracticable to conduct coordination tests through interpreters.” Id.
9
Id. at 146.
10
See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting forth the three-factor balancing test).
11
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 146 (“[U]nlike judicial or extrajudicial proceedings, where it
is essential that defendants who do not speak sufficient English be provided qualified interpreters in order to meet due process standards, ‘the investigation of suspected intoxicated
driving by the police . . . is not a judicial . . . or even an administrative proceeding.’ ”). See
also People v. Hayes, 950 N.E.2d 118, 123 (N.Y. 2011) (noting there is no risk of an erroneous deprivation of defendants’ liberty interest by failing to conduct a physical coordination
test).
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Shortly before eleven o’clock on the night of June 26, 2007,
Officer Iglesias observed a car parked partially on the sidewalk, facing oncoming traffic.12 Upon approaching the car, the officer saw the
defendant slouched over the steering wheel in the driver’s seat.13 The
officer knocked on the window; when the door opened, the officer
smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle and observed an open bottle of beer in the car and the keys in the ignition
with the motor running.14 The officer testified that the defendant was
unable to exit the car on his own and needed the officer’s assistance
to do so.15 The officer proceeded to ask the defendant some questions, at which point the defendant responded in Spanish.16 Based on
the officer’s observations and the defendant’s response, the officer
placed him under arrest.17
Officer Padilla responded to the scene to take the defendant to
the 45th Precinct for a breathalyzer test.18 At the precinct, Officer
King, the breathalyzer operator, proceeded to tell the defendant why
he was under arrest and asked the defendant if he wanted to take the
breathalyzer test.19 The defendant responded to the officer in Spanish, at which point Officer King realized there was a “language barrier.”20 Officer King read the information regarding the breathalyzer
test in English and then played a tape which repeated the information
in Spanish.21 The defendant agreed to take the breathalyzer test, and
the results indicated that the defendant’s blood alcohol content was
12

Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. (noting that the officer further “testified that the defendant was unsteady on his feet,
had bloodshot eyes, and appeared to be intoxicated.”).
16
Id. (noting the officer asked the defendant in Spanish if he was drunk and the defendant
replied “Yes I am drunk. That’s why I parked over here.”).
17
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
18
Id. (noting that Officer “Padilla also testified that the defendant was unsteady on his
feet, needed help to walk to the police van, and had bloodshot eyes with dilated pupils, and
that his breath smelled strongly of alcohol.”). See also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 35:22
(McKinney 2009).
19
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 142; see also 35 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 194:59 (“A breath testing device is a scientifically reliable instrument which . . . is capable of producing an accurate measurement of a motorist’s blood alcohol content. ”).
20
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
21
Id. (stating that Officer Padilla assisted Officer King in explaining to the defendant in
Spanish that the procedures required the test).
13
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.21, almost three times the legal limit.22 Officer King, who was specially trained to administer the physical coordination test,23 and did so
frequently, testified that he did not give the physical coordination test
to the defendant because “[the defendant] did not speak English.”24
A jury found the defendant, Raul Salazar, guilty of driving
while intoxicated.25 Following his conviction, Salazar moved to set
aside the verdict26 on the ground that the NYPD procedure of administrating both breathalyzers and physical coordination tests to English
speaking DWI suspects, while offering only the breathalyzer test to
non-English speakers, violated both the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clause guaranteed by both federal27 and state28 constitutions.29 The Bronx County Supreme Court, following its prior decision,30 granted the defendant’s motion, set aside the verdict, and dis22
Id. See also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2) (“Driving while intoxicated; per se. No
person shall operate a motor vehicle while such person has .08 of one per centum or more by
weight of alcohol in the person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person’s . . .
breath . . . .”).
23
See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 16:6 (McKinney 2009) (“When a driver is stopped by
the police there are several screening devices the police use in order to determine whether to
arrest the driver for an intoxication related offense. Some involve blowing into a field sobriety instrument . . . [o]thers require the driver to perform some physical act.”
24
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 142 (noting that “although Officer Padilla assisted him with
the breathalyzer test, he did not want Padilla to translate the coordination test instructions
since ‘part of the test is following directions . . . [and] [he] wouldn’t know if the officer truly
and accurately described what I was saying’ or whether Padilla was ‘using his own words or
translating exactly what [he] said.’ ”). Furthermore, Officer King stated that the Police Department does not have a tape in Spanish of the instructions to the physical coordination test.
Id.
25
Id.
26
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.30 (1) (McKinney 1970) provides, in pertinent part:
At any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence, the
court may, upon motion of the defendant, set aside or modify the verdict
or any part thereof upon . . . [a]ny ground appearing in the record which,
if raised upon an appeal from a prospective judgment of conviction,
would require a reversal or modification of the judgment as a matter of
law by an appellate court.
27
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states, in pertinent part: “[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
28
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11, states, in pertinent part: “No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof.”; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6,
states, in pertinent part: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.”
29
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 142-43.
30
See People v. Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d 784, 798 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (setting aside the verdict
convicting a Spanish speaking defendant of driving while impaired by alcohol on grounds
that the procedure employed by the police department, administering only a breathalyzer test
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missed all charges, finding that the procedure employed by the
NYPD violated the defendant’s equal protection and due process
rights.31 The State appealed to the Appellate Division, which ultimately rejected the rationale followed by the Bronx County Supreme
Court, reversed the order, and reinstated the defendant’s conviction,
finding no violation of the defendant’s equal protection or due process rights.32
III.

THE COURT’S ANALYSIS IN PEOPLE V. SALAZAR
A.

Equal Protection Claim

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”33 This clause protects against “intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents.”34
The New York Constitution provides its citizens with an
equivalent constitutional safeguard as provided in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.35 Article 1, § 11 of
the New York State Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision
thereof.”36 Further, New York Civil Rights Law § 40(2), expands the
safeguards of Article 1, § 11 stating “[n]o person shall, because of
race, creed, color, national origin . . . be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights . . . by the state or any agency or subdivision of
to a Spanish speaking individual while requiring a breathalyzer and a physical coordination
test of English speaking individuals, violated the defendant’s due process and equal protection rights thus requiring reversal of the judgment).
31
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (“the procedure employed by the police department created a ‘classification predicated upon a person’s Hispanic origin and their inability to speak
and/or understand the English language and therefore discriminates against primarily Spanish speaking individuals of Hispanic origin’ and thus, violated the equal protection clause
under either a strict or rational basis analysis.” Further the court found a due process violation whereas the “procedures utilized deprived [the] defendant of his liberty interest in that
this deprivation could be eliminated by additional or substitute procedures.”).
32
Id.
33
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
34
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Grace Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
35
See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 18 (N.Y. 2006).
36
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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the state.”37
Claimed violations of the Equal Protection Clause are assessed under either a “strict scrutiny” or “rational basis” analysis.
Strict scrutiny is appropriate when a suspect class is disadvantaged or
where a fundamental right is burdened by governmental action.38 Rational basis scrutiny, the lowest standard, is applicable where neither
a suspect class nor a fundamental right is implicated, and thus, the action need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.39
In determining which standard was appropriate, the court noted that “[i]t has long been the rule that ‘language, by itself, does not
identify members of a suspect class’ ”;40 therefore, strict scrutiny
analysis is not triggered unless a defendant can demonstrate that, either in his particular case or in general, the policy intentionally discriminated against Hispanic ethnicity.41 Absent this showing, a rational basis analysis was appropriate to evaluate the defendant’s
equal protection claim.42 In analyzing the defendant’s claims, the
court found that the practice at issue did not disadvantage a suspect
class; therefore, the strict scrutiny analysis, requiring the government
to establish a compelling justification for the practice, was not implicated.43 The court reasoned that “[a]lthough Hispanics as an ethnic
group, constitute a suspect class under equal protection analysis, the
practice at issue here is facially neutral as to ethnicity.” 44 The police
department policy regarding when to administer a physical coordination test was based on a suspect’s ability to speak and understand
English, not based upon a suspect’s race or national origin. 45 The

37

N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c(2) (McKinney 2003).
See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993); see also Soberal-Perez, 717 F.2d at 41
(noting that strict scrutiny requires the government to show a compelling state interest).
39
See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
40
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
41
Id. (stating that “ ‘[s]uch a claim requires that a [defendant] show an intent to discriminate against the suspect class.’ ”). To establish intentional discrimination, the defendant
must show that “ ‘the decision maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action
at least in part ‘because of’ not merely in ‘spite of’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.’ ” Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. (stating that the trial court’s determination cannot stand). See also Regents of Univ.
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
44
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44.
45
Id. at 144.
38
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court found nothing in the record to indicate that the police chose not
to administer a physical coordination test on the “basis of antiHispanic animus.”46 In fact, the evidence revealed that “non-Englishspeaking suspects [we]re not offered the option of taking a physical
coordination test, in order to avoid confusion and complications due
to a language barrier.”47 Therefore, intentional discrimination based
on ethnicity was not established, and the defendant’s claim was evaluated under the rational basis analysis.48
In order to find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under a rational basis analysis, the plaintiff “must show that the governmental action,” here, the NYPD’s policy regarding the administration of sobriety tests, “does not bear a rational relationship to a
legitimate government purpose.”49 However, the court found that the
NYPD’s interest in the reliability of coordination tests indicated a rational basis for the policy.50 The court further reasoned that unlike a
judicial or administrative proceeding, where the failure to provide an
interpreter was likely in violation of equal protection or due process,
physical coordination tests are merely an investigative tool, which
does not give rise to the defendant’s right to have an interpreter present in order to administer the test.51 Requiring the police department
to have qualified interpreters to administer investigative procedures,
such as the physical coordination test, would “impose unrealistic and
substantial financial and administrative burdens” on the police department.52 The avoidance of those obligations constitutes a rational
basis for the NYPD’s procedure of not administering coordination
tests to non-English speaking suspects.53 Additionally, to support its
refusal to demand the police department to implement a policy re46

Id.
Id. (quoting People v. Perez, 898 N.Y.S.2d 402 (2010), and People v. Burnet, 882
N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (addressing the same issue and accepting this rationale)).
48
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
49
Id.
50
Id. (noting that evidence supports the finding that “conducting the test through a Spanish-speaking police officer who was not trained in conducting the test could compromise the
reliability of the result.”); see also Perez, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 407 (stating that it is impractical
to conduct coordination tests through interpreters).
51
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 144-45 (“[A] defendant’s right to an interpreter is available
only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against the
defendant.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52
Id. at 145 (“[T]he time it would take an interpreter to get to a testing site would serve to
degrade evidence, as the passage of time impacts sobriety.”).
53
Id.
47
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quiring interpreters of various languages to administer physical coordination tests, the court expressed its position of being deferential to
the judgment of public officials stating, “[s]uch policy making is not
a function of the court.”54
B.

Due Process Claim

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees all citizens the right not to be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.55 New York
State guarantees to all citizens the same protection in Article 1, § 6 of
the New York State Constitution.56
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a due process claim is determined on a case-by-case inquiry analyzed according to the three-factor test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.57 The
three-part test examines,
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.58
The due process claim framed by the defendant asserted that it
is “unconstitutional to deprive any [DWI] suspect of [a physical coordination] test.”59 The defendant claimed that the officer’s failure to
administer the physical coordination test deprived him of due process
because such a test may have provided evidence favorable to his defense.60 The court responded to the defendant’s assertion and differentiated the situation in the present case to situations where “the police failed to disclose or preserve evidence.”61 The court pointed out
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
Id. at 335.
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
Id.
Id. at 146. See People v. Kelly, 467 N.E.2d 498 (N.Y. 1984); see also Hayes, 950
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the error in the defendant’s argument in equating the word “obtain”
with “preserve” and stated “[i]t is well settled law of this state ‘that
the police have no affirmative duty to gather or help gather evidence
for an accused.’ ”62
Further, the court applied the Mathews three-part test and
found that a “DWI suspect does not have a due process right to compel the police to administer a coordination test.”63 Although a significant liberty interest of a defendant is at stake in a criminal case, the
court noted that, in this case, the defendant failed to show that the
procedure employed by the police department presented a “great risk
that he w[ould] be erroneously deprived of his liberty.”64 Further, the
“probable value of substitute procedural safeguards, i.e., to require
the [NYPD] to have trained interpreters in numerous languages available around the clock on short notice, would result in enormous fiscal
and administrative burdens on the police department.”65 The court
stated that these burdens were legitimate concerns for the government; thus, a non-English speaking DWI suspect did not have a due
process right to compel a police officer to administer a physical coordination test.66 Additionally, the court acknowledged that although it
is well established that in order to satisfy due process, a non-English
speaking defendant must be provided an interpreter at judicial proceedings,67 but this right did not extend to the investigative stages of
a trial.68
N.E.2d at 122 (noting “[t]here is a difference between preserving evidence already within the
possession of the prosecution and the entirely distinct obligation of affirmatively obtaining
evidence for the benefit of a criminal defendant”).
62
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 146. See also Hayes, 950 N.E.2d at 122-23 (noting that the
defendant does not have the right to have police perform certain investigative procedures
simply because they may yield results favorable to the defendant).
63
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
64
Id. at 146-47 (“Defendant has made no showing and has failed to cite any precedent to
support his proposition that he has a right to a pre-arrest translator or that failure to provide
non-English speakers with a physical coordination test violates either equal protection or due
process.”).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 147.
67
See People v. Ramos, 258 N.E.2d 197, 198 (N.Y. 1970). See also People v. Rodriquez,
633 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1995) (“It is a well-established precept of due
process that non-English speaking defendants in criminal actions are entitled to an interpreter
. . . .”). See also Yellen v. Baez, 676 N.Y.S.2d, 724, 725 (Civ. Ct. 1997) (“It is a fundamental axiom of our system of jurisprudence that due process of law includes the right to have an
adequate interpretation of the proceedings.”).
68
Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 146 (quoting Perez, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 408 (“ ‘[T]he investigation of suspected intoxicated driving by the police, in the field or at the intoxicated driver
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FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF PEOPLE V. SALAZAR

On its face, NYPD’s procedure of not administering a physical coordination test to non-English speaking defendants and routinely administering such a test to English speaking suspects appears to
be discriminatory toward non-English speaking defendants. This is a
clear case of the NYPD discriminating against non-English speaking
suspects, specifically Hispanics, which should trigger strict scrutiny.
The demographics of New York City, especially Bronx County, indicates an overwhelming Hispanic population,69 which displays the
need for greater equal protection of the laws to be afforded to Hispanics.
The NYPD’s physical coordination test procedure disadvantages such criminal defendants at a critical stage of a DWI case;70
evidence of the physical coordination test is unavailable to a nonEnglish speaking defendant, while that same type of evidence is
available to an English speaking defendant.71 Evidence revealed during the physical coordination test may be crucial to a criminal defendant’s case, and thus, the unfair disadvantage placed on nonEnglish speaking DWI suspects cannot withstand the constitutional
claims raised in Salazar.
It is difficult to accept the argument that the administration of
physical coordination tests to non-English speaking defendants presents too great an obstacle when breathalyzer tests are routinely administered to non-English speaking defendants. Clearly, explaining
testing facility, is not a judicial, quasi-judicial, or even an administrative proceeding.’ ”)).
69
See New York City Dep’t of City Planning, Population: American Community Survey,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popacs.shtml (click the “2012” link in the “Hispanic Origin” section of the table to open up the report) (last visited May 2, 2014).
70
See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2)(a)(1) (noting a DWI case has unique circumstances; relevant evidence is collected within two hours of an arrest).
71
See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). The Court stated that:
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal
prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness. We have long interpreted this standard of fairness to require that
criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense. To safeguard that right, the Court has developed
“what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence.” Taken together, this group of constitutional privileges
delivers exculpatory evidence into the hands of the accused, thereby protecting the innocent from erroneous conviction and ensuring the integrity
of our criminal justice system.
Id.
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the procedures and consequences of a breathalyzer test to a nonEnglish speaking defendant cannot be any less confusing or burdensome than explaining the simple instructions required in administering a physical coordination test. Therefore, the court’s willingness to
forgo physical coordination tests with non-English speaking defendants because of a language barrier is not plausible because the same
language barrier exists in administering a breathalyzer test, yet the
NYPD administers the latter without objection.
In order to protect non-English speaking suspects and remedy
the disparity in treatment regarding the procedures afforded to English and non-English speaking DWI suspects, reasonable efforts
should be made to ensure those non-English speaking defendants’
rights are protected. The court did not take into account other means
of providing non-English speaking defendants with an opportunity to
perform physical coordination tests other than requiring the NYPD to
have trained interpreters available. The court overlooked the obvious
possibility of creating videotaped procedures for the most commonly
spoken languages that would explain the simple instructions of a
physical coordination test, similar to the videotaped procedures already shown to non-English speaking defendants prior to administering the breathalyzer test.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Appellate Division’s holding in Salazar evidences the
court favoring governmental interests, which prejudice defendants,
over the constitutional rights of non-English speaking defendants.72
The failure of the NYPD to administer a physical coordination test to
non-English speaking suspects, when English speaking suspects are
routinely administered such tests, is clearly discriminatory and in violation of the equal protection and due process clause. The NYPD’s
claim that a procedure that forgoes administering such a test to nonEnglish speaking defendants eliminates confusion and complications
due to a “language barrier” has no merit when the same confusion
and complications due to a “language barrier” are present while administering a breathalyzer test. If the NYPD is able to administer a
breathalyzer test by playing a tape that repeats the information in the
appropriate language, without confusion and complications due to a

72

Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d 140.
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“language barrier,” then clearly the NYPD can adopt similar means
to administer a physical coordination test.
The court’s holding in Salazar deprives non-English speaking
criminal defendants of the procedures and protections afforded to
English speaking defendants. The implications of this holding will
cause courts to deny equal protection of the laws to non-English
speaking defendants because of alleged complications as a result of a
“language barrier.”73 In evaluating such constitutional claims, the
overriding factor should be to ensure that justice is served. Considering the unique circumstances in a DWI case, the use of a translator or
videotape to administer a physical coordination test to non-English
speaking defendants during the critical investigative stage will ensure
a fair trial by providing evidence that will assist both the prosecution
and the defense.
Daniela Giordano
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